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IN THE SUPREME CO,UR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE AUTOMOBILE AND
CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
RICHARD J. SALISBURY and
DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE
AGENCY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
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12511

REPLY BRIEF. OF APP'ELLANT'
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

THE FINDINGS OF THE JURY AT THE
FIRST TRIAL ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS
APPEAL.
State Auto's numerous references to and reliance
upon the "first trial," "two juries," "two unanimous
juries," etc., (Respondent's brief at 1, 2, 13, 15, 18, 24 and
25) are both improper and misplaced. The findings of
the first jury are foreign to this proceeding and can neither
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create facts nor add weight to or subtract from the findings of the jury from which this appeal is taken.
The court's judgment in granting a new trial admits
to the error of the prior proceeding and declares as null
and void all verdicts and findings resulting therefrom:
"The granting of a new trial shall place the parties
in the same position as if no trial had been had.
All the evidence must be produced anew, and the
former verdict or decision shall not be used or
referred to either in evidence or in argument .
"
Utah Code Ann. §77-38-2, 1953
If State Auto is to prevail upon this appeal, it must
do so upon that which resulted from the second trial. Its
continual reliance upon the first trial suggests the weakness of its position before this court.

Likewise, State Auto's brief is replete with improper
innuendo that Richard Salisbury, in binding Mr. Crawforth's application, was following a willful and intentional course of conduct to deceive and trick State Auto
into accepting a prohibited risk.
The record lends no support to such improper suggestions
POINT

II.

AS THE JURY FOUND NO VIOLATION OF
THE AGENCY AGREEMENT, THE JUDGMENT BELOW WAS ERRONEOUS.
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When an agency is created, the parties are free to
determine the limits of their rights and responsibilities.
The parties may choose to make no formal agreement and
let the common law govern. They may elect to supplement or modify the common law in part with a writing.
Finally, to assure a complete understanding, they may
choose to embody the entire scope of their rights and
duties into what the law calls an integrated agreement or
simply "Integration."
When State Auto solicited Diversified to be its agent,
the agency contract prepared by State Auto was an integration. The integrating clause is found on page 3 of
Exhibit 1-P. It very clearly points out that the agency
contract constitutes "the entire agreement between the
parties." (Italics added.)
The integrated contract was drafted by
and must be construed strictly against it as
the creation of duties not set forth in the
Guinand vs. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450
( 1969).

State Auto
pertains to
agreement.
P. 2d 467

Just as State Auto may enforce upon Diversified the
duties of the agreement so also is Diversified justly entitled to rely upon the agreement as the outer limit of its
responsibility.
As concisely stated by the Supreme Court of Idaho:
"Where the principal sues the agent in tort upon
the theory that the agent has negligently dealt with
affairs entrusted to him by the principal, the ques-
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tion whether the agent has improperly performed
depends upon his agreement with the principal,
since this determines the scope of the agent's undertaking.'' E. S. Harper Co. vs. General Insurance
Company of America, 91 Idaho 767, 430 P. 2d
658, 662 (1967). (Italics added.)
See also the authorities cited therein.
Now, after the jury has rejected State Auto's position that Mr. Salisbury violated either the "Prohibitive
List" or "specific underwriting guides," State Auto suggests we ignore the integration clause of the contract and
look beyond the agreement to create additional duties not
embodied therein.
The benefits conferred upon State Auto by virrue of
the integrated agreement cannot be rejected or modified
because the protection they J.lso afford Diversified is now
to State Auto's disadvantage.
State Auto could easilY have included language in
the integrated agreement which would have precluded
binding
Crawforth's application.
likewise. it could have left out of the agreement that
language on page 2 which both requires and permits Diversified to:
"
independently act in accordance with his
[sic] own ideas and exercise his
own judgment.''
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State Auto did neither; it cannot now be heard to
complain about the lack of protection afforded by its own
contract!
State Auto further argues that because Diversified
was authorized to bind coverage only on risks "usually
written and authorized" by it that Diversified should not
have bound the Crawforth risk based upon the letters (Exhibits 6-P, 9-P through 15-P) received by Diversified
from State Auto.
The phrase "usually written and authorized" is susceptible to at least two different interpretations.
The interpretation urged by State Auto is that defendant, by virtue of this clause, could not bind coverage
on certain automobile risks even if the risk was not on the
"Prohibitive List" or not permitted by the "specific underwriting guides."
Otherwise stated, Diversified becomes the insurer of
State Auto as concerns assuring State Auto provides a
proper and up-to-date Prohibited List!
The more logical construction of the "usually written
and authorized" clause is that it pertains to kinds of insurance and not categories of risk. In other words, if State
Auto normally wrote automobile liability, casualty,
products liability or any other kind of insurance, Diversified could bind such risks. Likewise, Diversified could
not bind, for example, a homeowners policy if State Auto
did not usually underwrite such coverage.
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This latter construction is clearly the most reasonable because it requires the agent to understand the general nature of the principal' s business but not, as a single
agent, continually second guess what a nationwide company may be or is "usually" doing as regards insurance
for specific classes of individuals or entities.
State Auto's proffered interpretation both ignores the
integrated nature of the agreement requiring prohibited
risks to be mentioned in "specific underwriting guides"
and asks this court to construe its own contract most favorable to it! Such unsound arguments have continually
been rejected by the courts.
CONCLUSION
Diversified was solicited by State Auto to become the
latter's agent. State Auto chose an integrated agreement
as the basis for determining the rights and duties beween
it and Diversified.
Just as Diversified was bound to perform as outlined
in the agreement, so was State Auto. The agreement gave
to Diversified authority to bind risks except as precluded
only by the "Prohibited List" and "specific underwriting
guides." Diversified, therefore, had every right to bind
coverage which was not prohibited by either.
State Auto's entire case depends upon the creation of
a duty of inquiry resulting from a variety of correspondence. The integrated agreement does not mention such a
duty.
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Even State Auto has never contended such letters
were "specific underwriting guides," and obviously they
do not constitute any part of the "Prohibited List." Indeed, only a single letter makes mention of the Prohibited
List and then in a context of multiple facts that would
leave any reasonable person guessing as to which fact or
combination of facts reference is made.
The jury rejected State Auto's contention that the
agency agreement had been breached in the binding of
the Crawforth application. That agreement being the
totality of Diversified's duties, it was error to award
judgment based upon a duty outside the agreement of the
parties. The judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry and
Lowell N. Hawkes of
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Seventh Floor,
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Appellant

7

